Institutional Aspects of Regional Policy: The Impact of Centralized vs. Decentralized Responsibilities in the Field of Regional Policy on Economic Efficiency and Interregional Cohesion by Martin T. W. Rosenfeld
  1
Institutional Aspects of Regional Policy:  
The Impact of Centralized vs. Decentralized Responsibilities 
in the Field of Regional Policy on 
Economic Efficiency and Interregional Cohesion 
 
Paper (Draft Version, July 2003) prepared for the  
 
Congress of the European Regional Science Association (ERSA) 




Martin T.W. Rosenfeld 
 
 
Professor Dr. Martin T.W. Rosenfeld 
Head of the Department for Regional and Urban Economics at the  
Halle Institute for Economic Research (Institut fu r Wirtschaftsforschung Halle [IWH]) 
Postal Address: Kleine Maerkerstrasse 8, D-06108 Halle, Germany 
Phone:  +49-345-775 3 750 




There are many studies on evaluating the impact of different instruments of regional 
policy on cohesion and economic efficiency, but only few investigations so far into the 
institutional framework of these instruments. One institutional aspect has become more 
and more relevant in public discussions: In federations (e. g. in the EU), we have a 
tendency of centralization in many fields of public policy, also in regional policy. 
Therefore, there have been made proposals in order to decentralize regional policy. The 
possible more central or more decentral arrangements of regional policy are located 
between two polar cases: At one pole, we have an arrangement where only the central 
level of government is responsible for regional policy; neither any subcentral unit of   2
government, nor the regions which are to be supported have any influence for deciding 
on regional policy instruments, and only the central government has to finance regional 
policy with its own resources. At the other pole, we find an arrangement where mainly 
the subcentral units of government and the less developed regions themselves are 
deciding on regional policy and are responsible for financing. The paper is evaluating 
the consequences of a decentralization in the field of regional policy, in the sense that 
the current allocation of responsibilities is changed in the direction of the described 
decentral arrangement of regional policy. 
The paper comes to the result that there are only a few arguments to legitimate the 
central (European) competences in the field of regional policy. In any case, subsidy-
control should remain a task of the EU level. As ’ at least in the case of Germany ’ the 
European system of regional policy has some advantages, as compared to the national 
system, a decentralization may not be favourable. With regard to the responsibility of 
financing regional policy, a decentralization would be better than the present state. But 
this does not mean that the more central units of government should no longer be 
responsible for shifting resources to the poorer regions. Change should take place in the 
sense that the supported regions are getting more leeway in deciding how to make the 
best use of these resources. But such a decentralized system will only work under 
several conditions.   3
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1.  Introduction 
In recent years, there has been an ongoing debate on regional policy in Europe and the 
present member states of the EU. The main reason for this debate is the EU“s eastern 
enlargement, which will lead to an increase in regional divergence within the EU. More 
or less all the regions in the accession countries have, up to now, a GDP per capita 
which is significant below the European average, what will make them eligible for 
European regional policy measures after the enlargement has taken place. The GDP per 
capita in the regions of the accession countries is also lower than the GDP per capita in 
the majority of regions within the existing EU which are supported today by European 
regional policy measures. After the enlargement, according to the  existing  rules of 
European regional policy, these regions will drop out of the system of EU regional 
policy  ’ although their economic development problems will not have changed (for 
details see Rosenfeld and Kronthaler 2002). There are different proposals in order to 
help the regions in question after the EU enlargement (see e.g. Rosenfeld 2001; 
Akademie fu r Raumforschung und Landesplanung 2003). Some scholars and politicians 
are suggesting that the EU should expand its budget for regional policy and give not 
only support to the regions in the accession countries, but also to the regions which are 
supported today by the EU. Others are proposing that regional policy should be re-
nationalized, at least for the existing member states. 
Such a re-nationalization of regional policy is also favoured by the critics of an 
expanding ’ or even: overwhelming ’ EU level of government and is in accordance 
with general ideas of decentralization in the present system of EU administration, and 
also in national-subnational fiscal relations within the EU member states. In market 
economies, according to the principle of subsidiarity, the responsibilites for public 
activities should be in general allocated to the lower levels of government, as far as it 
has not been proven that an assignment of responsibilities to a higher level could lead to 
an increase in economic welfare. 
As we have today, in fact, at the EU level, als well as in the EU member states, 
comparatively centralized arrangements of regional policy institutions, the paper is 
dealing with the question whether a more decentralized system in this field of public 
policy could lead to gains in economic welfare. Up to now, this question has not been 
discussed comprehensively. Many studies are evaluating the impact of different 
instruments of regional policy on interregional cohesion and economic efficiency. But   5
there are only few investigations so far into the  institutional framework of these 
instruments.  
The (dis-) advantages of a centralized system of regional policy have to be compared to 
a decentralized system. The possibilities of a decentralization are depending on the 
institutional settings of the EU-member states. As there are great differences in the 
public sector institutions among the EU member states, the paper is focussing on the 
situation of just one country: Germany. The German public sector has often been 
described as a ” centralized federation„ , the state level and the local level are in general 
dominated by the federal level of government. Like in other countries, Germany has 
established its own national system of regional policy, which is also dominated by the 
federal level. There have been many proposals to decentralize the German public sector, 
and some of these proposals have included the national competences for regional policy, 
(see e.g. Reform der Finanzverfassung 1998) but ’ so far ’ , as for the regional policy of 
the EU, there has been no detailled analysis of the benefits and the costs of such a 
reform.  
After a short operationalization of the subject of this paper (see section 2), the general 
possibilities of a central vs. decentral arrangement in the field of regional policy are 
described (section 3). Section 4 is giving an overview on the present state of allocation 
of competences in the field of regional policy. Afterwards, it is discussed for different 
categories of competences, which costs and which benefits would arise if the present 
allocation of competences is changed in direction  of a more decentralized system 
(section 5). The final section (6) is asking for the political implications of this 
discussion. 
2.  Operationalizing Regional Policy 
In economic theory, as well as in public discussions, there is often some confusion on 
the meaning of ” regional policy„ . Some scholars and politicians are identifying regional 
policy with all kinds of policy measures of a region which are oriented at economic 
growth. But in this view, there would be no difference between regional policy and 
economic growth policy in general. Therefore, in this paper, regional policy is defined 
as economic policy  for regions by policymakers from a higher level of government. 
” Regional policy is always a policy  öfrom above“„ (Artobolevskiy 1997, p. 3), what 
means that a minimum degree of centralization is always necessary for regional policy. 
Other important features of regional policy are that   6
-  ” regional policy exists only when regions/areas receive unequal levels of support or 
rights from the state„ (Artobolevskiy 1997, p. 3), what means that regional policy 
always includes an element of interregional redistribution, 
-  regional policy is trying to promote or stimulate private economic activities in 
certain regions ( ” supported regions„ ); regional policy is not aiming at only 
alimentating or compensating those regions which are economically lagging 
behind.
1 
The targets of regional policy are either growth- or equalization-oriented (cf. e.g. Eckey 
1978). This means, that some concepts of regional policy are aiming at supporting the 
economic growth centers of an economy, in order to strengthen national economic 
growth. Or regional policy wants to shift resources and growth potentials from the 
growth centers to the less developed regions, in order to making them ’ in the long run 
’ independend from outside support. 
On the EU level, today, the so-called  structural funds (the European Regional 
Development Fund, ERDF; the European Social Fund, ESF; the European Agricultural 
Guidance and Guarantee Fund, EAGGF) are the main instruments of regional policy. In 
Germany, the most important program of national regional policy is the federal-state-
program  ‘ Improving the Regional Structure of the Economy”  ( ”GRW-programt
2). 
Both the EU and the German programs are oriented on equalization and want to 
stimulate economic activities in the less developed regions. 
3.  General Possibilities of Allocating Competences between Central and Decentral 
  Units of Government in the Field of Regional Policy 
In each field of public policy, there are several possibilities of constructing 
intergovernmental relations (IGR). The responsibilities for regional policy could either 
be allocated to the central or to the decentral units of government. But ’ as had been 
discussed before, and differently to other sectors of public policy  ’ at least some 
competences for regional policy measures have always to be allocated to a more central 
governmental level, which is able to give unequal levels of support to the less central 
units of government. As Figure 1 illustrates, the competences for deciding on the 
general targets of regional policy and for deciding on the supported regions have always 
to be reserved to the more central levels. ” More central„  does of course not mean 
necessarily the most central level of government, but only a level which is more central 
than the regions to be supported. Therefore, in a system of totally decentralized   7
competences for regional policy, the competences for deciding on the general targets of 
regional policy and for deciding on the supported regions have to be allocated to a 
middle level of government. 
The responsibilities for deciding on the admitted set of instruments, deciding on the 
targets and instruments for specific regions, and for financing regional policy could be 
allocated to either level of government. In a totally decentralized system, the 
competences in question would be allocated to the governmental bodies of the 
supported regions. 
Figure 1: Possibilities for IGR in the Field of Regional Policy. 
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In this paper“s section 5, it will be discussed what are the consequences of changing the 
present allocation of competences in the field of regional policy in direction to a totally 
decentralized arrangement, as it is described in Figure 1. 
4.  The Present Allocation of Competences in the Field of European-German 
  Regional Policy 
Figure 2 is showing the present allocation of competences for regional policy in the 
systems of the EU structural funds and the German GRW-program. In both systems, the 
decisions on the general targets of regional policy, on the supported regions, and on the 
admitted set of instruments are reserved to the EU level and the national (federal) level
3, 
respectively. 
The competence for deciding on the targets and on regional policy instruments for 
individual supported regions is a ” joint responsibility„ , what means, that the subnational 
and the national level (in the case of the German GRW-program) or the subnational, 
national and the EU-level (in the case of the EU structural funds) are sharing the   8
responsibilities for this kind of decision. The subnational level, in Germany the state or 
” Lander„  level, is responsible for developing so-called ” operational programs„  (in the 
context of the EU regional policy) and so-called ” regional support programs„ (in the 
context of the GRW-program); but these programs have to be approved by the EU level 
and by the German federal level, respectively. 
The responsibility for financing is also a ” joint responsibility„ . The EU level is giving 
matching (special purpose) grants in aid to the Lander level. The federal level is also 
responsible for financing matching (special purpose) grants in aid to the Lander level. 
And in some cases, also the supported regions
4 are involved in (co-)financing regional 
policy measures which are intended to raise their potential for economic growth. This is 
true especially for financing expenditures for public infrastructure. 
Figure 2: The Status Quo of IGR for European-German Regional Policy. 
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5.  The Incidence of a More Decentralized Allocation of Competences 
5.1  Deciding on the General Targets of Regional Policy 
Are the political decision-makers on the higher levels of government more inclined to 
spend money for less developed regions than the decision-makers at the lower levels? Is 
regional policy for regions that are lagging behind a kind of a ” merit good„  (Musgrave), 
in the sense that it is necessary to force the decision-makers at the lower levels of 
government to help the less developed regions? (If this is  the case, some critics of 
regional policy in general would, of course, always prefer a decentral arrangement of 
regional policy, in order to minimize the public intervention in the  ” natural„  
interregional allocation of growth and welfare which results from the market process.)   9
From the view of economic theory, the answer to this question depends on the political 
and economic structure of the jurisdictions at the more central resp. more decentral level 
of government. If we look at a jurisdiction L at the subnational (or: middle) level of 
government, the decision of the politicians from L for a growth- versus equalization-
oriented regional policy will depend on 
-  the economic position of L, as compared to other jurisdictions at the same level of 
governement (the higher the position, the more will the politicians tend to a 
equalization-oriented regional policy; they will tend to decide on a growth-oriented 
version of regional policy, if the economic performance of L as a whole is weaker 
than the performance of other jurisdictions at the same level of government. In the 
result of this decision, L as a whole may improve its performance, but at the price of 
increasing regional disparities within L), 
-  the degree of competition between L and its neighbouring jurisdictions (if there is 
not much competition, e.g. because of an existing fiscal equalizing system, the 
tendency for a equalization-oriented regional policy within the jurisdiction L will 
increase), 
-  the regional disparities within L (if the disparities are already relatively strong, the 
politicians will have a tendency for a equalization-oriented regional policy),  
-  the conditions on the ‘ political market”  within L (if the politicians are elected in 
certain districts or delegated by the parliaments of certain subregions, they will have 
a stronger tendency to support the economic progress of their election-regions than 
if they are elected according to the rules of proportional representation. Public 
benefits for certain regions may be used by politicians to get more support by voters 
for their own policy in general or for the EU-level in general), 
In general, the same arguments will also influence the decisions of politicians at the 
more central levels of government. But at a higher level of government (within a larger 
jurisdiction), the regional disparities will in general be greater than at a lower level. In 
addition, the degree of competition between jurisdictions will in general be higher at the 
lower than at a higher level of government. This leads to the conclusion that the more 
central units of government will have a stronger tendency towords equalization-oriented 
regional policy than the more decentral units. But it is impossible, from a theoretical 
point of view, to predict how large a jurisdiction must be for tending in this direction. 
Also another mechanism may work in the same direction. Ethnical minorities which are 
concentrated in some less developed subregions of L might find it easier to get support   10
for their subregions at the more central levels of government; the majority of voters in L 
could tend to neglect these subregions because of traditional prejudices against the 
minorities. 
With a look at the present practice of regional policy, both the EU and the German 
federal level have decided for equalization-oriented arrangements of regional policy. 
Therefore, if the competences of the EU in the field of regional policy were shifted to 
the national level of government, for Germany, there would be no change in the general 
target of regional policy. A shift towards the subnational (in Germany: Lander-) level of 
government could lead to different results, but as ’ at the moment ’ most German 
Lander have no institutions for subnational regional policy of their own, we have not 
enough evidence for predicting what really will happen. According to the theoretical 
considerations, there could be expected a change into the direction of a more growth-
oriented policy, but only if some other institutions like the system of fiscal equalization 
would be changed, too. 
5.2  Deciding on the Regions to be Supported 
In the following subsections of this paper, we will only look at the equalization-oriented 
kind of regional policy which is dominating in practice. If the policians have decided for 
such a policy, in order to reduce interregional disparities, it is necessary to identify 
those regions which are to be supported by regional policy measures. If ’ as has been 
explained in subsection 5.1 ’ there is a higher tendency for the actors at the higher 
levels of government to equalization-oriented regional policy than for those at the lower 
levels, one could expect that the more centralized the decision on the regions to be 
supported is, the greater will be the number of such regions. 
In the real world, the EU support for German regions is including (at the moment) 
mainly the so-called ‘ Objective-1-Regions” , the so-called ‘ Objective-2-Regions” , and 
the ” Interreg-Regions„
5. The German GRW-program is including so-called A-, B-, C-, 
and D-Regions, where the A-Regions are getting the highest, and the D-Regions the 
lowest level of support. The A- and B-Regions are located in East Germany, while the 
C- and D - Regions are regions within the poorer states of West Germany. The 
Objective-1-Regions are ’ at the moment ’ all regions in East Germany
6. Objective-2-
Regions are located in the more prosperous German states Baden-Wu rttemberg, 
Bavaria, Hessia, Northrhine-Westfalia and Hamburg, as well as in the less prosperous 
West-German states Rhineland-Palatinate, Lower Saxony, Schleswig-Holstein, Bremen   11
and West-Berlin (cf. Entscheidung der Kommission 2000). The regions to be supported 
under the GRW-program are ’ at the moment ’ also all regions in East Germany and 
some regions in the West. As far as Germany is concerned, the Interreg-Regions are 
mainly the counties and cities alongside the German borderline. Interreg is designed in 
order to stimulate croos-border, transnational and interregional cooperation, especially 
for those regions which share external border with the accession countries. 
A shift of competences from the EU to the German federal level of government would 
have two consequences: If the federal level will not re-adjust its federal regional policy, 
all the Objective-2-Regions in West-Germany will loose their support, and also the 
Interreg-Regions will loose their special support by the EU. Some of the regions which 
are supported by the EU (those which get support under Objective 1) are also GRW-
regions. For them, their status as supported regions will not change at all (although 
probably the contents and the amount of support money will change).  
The politicians of the present Objective-2-Regions may see the support of their regions 
by the EU as a contribution to improve their regional economic growth potentials. It is 
not realistic to assume that the federal level or the Lander level will replace the support 
from the EU level. From the view of economic theory, it is not easy to legitimate the EU 
support under Objective 2. Most of the Objective-2-Regions are situated in those 
German Lander which h ave, in general, no development problems. The Lander in 
question should be able to start their own, state-funded regional policy programs. The 
existence of a regional policy program for depressed areas in wealthier sub-national 
regions could be an incentive for the decisionmakers in those regions to neglect their 
depressed areas. 
With regard to the border regions, we may expect that the federal level would establish 
special programs for them, if the EU programs should run out. In former times, there 
had been national German programs for border regions, e. g. for the regions along the 
inner German border (‘Zonenrandforderung” ). But the set of regional policy measures 
could change. The Interreg-Program is aiming at measures in order to overcome the 
existing borderlines in Europe. The federal level might have a tendency to give help to 
the border regions only in order to stimulate their economic development, without 
taking into account the economic situation on the other side of the border. 
It is not quite clear how the Lander level would react if the Lander would become 
responsible for defining the supported regions. As has been explainend in the beginning 
of the chapter, the Lander will have less interest in equalization-oriented policy   12
measures than the central government. A decentralization from the federal to the Lander 
level in the case of the GRW-program would necessarily mean that for the East German 
Lander, regional policy for the whole territory has to come to an end, because the East 
German Lander as a whole are today supported by the GRW-program. 
5.3  Deciding on the Admitted Set of Instruments 
From the view of economic theory, we have no clues to answer the question whether a 
more central level of government is tending to favour other instruments for regional 
policy than a more decentral level of government. Sometimes it ist suggested that at the 
lower level, we will find a stronger tendency to favour subsidies in order to protect and 
preserve the current pattern of regional industry. However, this assumption has not yet 
been proven.  
On the EU-level, the instruments for regional policy are regulated in special orders by 
the EU commission on the structural funds. More or less the same regulations on 
regional policy instruments have been installed for the Objective-1-Regions, the 
Objective-2-Regions, and the Interreg-Regions. The EU regional policy is including a 
broad range of instruments. With regard to subsidies to private companies, the EU 
commission has established some general subidy-rules, which have to be followed not 
only in the system of European regional policy, but also in the systems of regional 
policy at the other levels of the public sector. These subsidy-rules are limiting the 
subsidies to certain regions and are defining maximum rates of subsidies for private 
investment. 
In the German federal system of regional policy, quite in contrast to the EU regional 
policy, only some few instruments are included: subsidies to private firms for private 
investment or for consultations by external experts or for training of employees or for 
research and development measures; grants in aid to local governments for 
” infrastructure for private firms„ . A decentralization in the sense that the EU would give 
up its responsibilities in the field of regional policy would therefore lead to a shrinking 
set of instruments which could be used for supporting the regions which have 
development problems. From the view of regional economics, a more complex set of 
instruments is better able to meet with the complexity of regional development 
problems. This means, that without the present set of instruments which are allowed 
within the EU system of regional policy, the regional development problems of some   13
regions may not be dealt with adequately, so that their economic performance could be 
worsened.  
From a theoretical point of view, it is not easy to explain why a national system of 
regional policy is narrower than the European. With regard to the German system, this 
may be explained by the institution of joint federal-state-commissions which have been 
installed for ruling the GRW-program. In such a commssion, there is always a strong 
tendency for  ” minimizing the costs of agreement„  (cf. Scharpf, Reissert, Schnabel 
1976).  
At least at present, a decentralization in the sense that the regional policy by the EU 
would come to an end, would lead to increasing development problems of the supported 
regions. 
A further decentralization of the competences in question (to the Lander-level or even to 
the level of the supported regions) could ’ in theory ’ lead to more diversity in the 
range of instruments for regional policy. But at present, there is no evidence on the 
possible instruments the Lander or the regions would use if they would become 
responsible for deciding on the admitted set of instruments. From looking at other fields 
of public policy, one could expect that the Lander will tend to come to some kind of 
harmonization of their regional policy instruments, in order to limit interjurisdicitional 
competition. The reason for this behavior may be seen in the typical German version of 
federalism, which is often called ‘ executive federalism” , what means that the Lander 
are mainly governmental units which have to carry out what the federal level has 
decided.  
A direct shift of competences to the regions to be supported could lead to different 
results: The policymakers in the supported regions could have a tendency for favoring 
subsidies to private firms, because of a stronger influence of pressure groups and private 
firms on policymakers at the lower levels of government, as compared with the higher 
levels. Consequently, the politicians at the more decentral level could tend to more 
inefficient decisions and perhaps to the support of regions with certain industries, which 
have no great future. As has been pointed out before, these assumptions have not yet 
been proven. But the regions, in contrast to the Lander level, could tend towards a 
greater variety in the set of instruments. 
A decentralization in the field of subsidy-rules could lead to losses in efficiency. If the 
supported regions could decide on their own on the rates of subsidies for private 
investment, it could be expected that the competition for investors among the supported   14
regions leads to a race in direction of higher and higher subsidies. Only the wealthier 
regions would be able to take part in this race. And a relocation of firms from one 
supported region to another supported region is making no sense. Therefore, the 
supported regions should obey to subsidy-rules which are made by jurisdicitons on the 
higher levels of government. But it is not easy to decide whether the EU-level or the 
national level of government should be responsible for the subsidy-rules. 
5.4  Deciding on the Development-Targets for Implementing a Specific Set of 
  Instruments in Specific Regions 
At present, in Germany, the Lander are responsible for setting up  ‘ operational 
programs”  (in the case of EU regional policy) and ‘ regional support programs”  (in the 
case of German national regional policy), in which they have to specify the develoment-
targets for the supported regions. The EU and the federal level in Germany
7, 
respectively, have to agree to these programs and plans. 
A more decentral allocation of competences could imply that the EU and the federal 
level would give up their present responsibilties in favour of the Lander level and / or 
that the supported regions could decide on their own about their future development. 
It may be supposed that the actors in the regions to be supported have ’ because of 
asymmetrical information ’ better information on their regional problems and specific 
shortages than actors on the higher levels of government. But this argument of a higher 
diagnostic capacity of decentral units of government in the field of regional policy has 
not been proven so far. It may also be, that the actors on the decentral level of 
government have a tendency to favor inefficient measures, if they themselves have 
direct advantages from this measures. Such negative results are depending on the 
incentive structure. If the actors on the lower level of government have to co-finance the 
regional policy measures with their own resources, it may be expected that they are 
more oriented on efficiency. In contrast, if ’ as it ist the case at present ’ the supported 
regions will get more money from the higher levels of government, if their situation has 
not improved in recent years, the actors at the regional level will tend to inefficiency 
(supporting firms that have no chance to survive, in the long run; subsidies for firms 
with a great influence on the regional labour market). 
Have the plans of the Lander to be approved by the higher levels of government? It 
would be more important that the Lander should be forced to evaluate and legitimate 
their development strategiey ex post. If the strategies of the Lander have not been able   15
to stimulate economic development, the decision makers at the Lander level must be 
responsible for explaining why the strategies did not work and what they are willing to 
do in the future in order to overcome the present problems. 
5.5  Financing Regional Policy 
As has been explained before, regional policy is always a policy of a more central level 
of government in order to help some regions or jurisdictions at a lower level of 
government to improve their economic performance. This makes it necessary that a 
jurisdiction at a higher level of government is transferring some kind of resources to the 
supported regions: Either fiscal resources (grants in aid) or the exception from some 
legal standards (e.g. from the general ban of subsidies to the private sector) or the right 
to make such exceptions. In the real world, grants in aid are the dominant resources to 
be transferred. Therefore, in this section, the other kinds of transfers will not be 
discussed. 
From the viewpoint of economic theory, those jurisdiction should be responsible for 
financing the grants in aid which have the competences for deciding on the general 
targets of regional policy, on the regions to be supported, on the admitted set of 
instruments and on the development-targets for implementing a specific set of 
instruments in specific regions. According to the principle of ‘ connexity”  ’ as one 
element of OLSONs ‘ principle of fiscal equivalence”  ’ only in this case, an efficient 
allocation of resources may be possible. If more than one jurisdiction is involved in the 
competences in question, all these jurisdictions should take part in financing the grants 
in aid. In the result we will find a kind of  ‘ mixed funding of public activities”  
(‘ Mischfinanzierung” ). But such an arrangement will always lead to losses in economic 
efficiency. Additional losses of efficiency will take place if the grants in aid to the 
regions to be supported have the character of special purpose grants in aid, what is the 
case in the field of grants in aid for local public infrastructure: 
(a) Losses in Efficiency because of Mixed Funding of Public Activities (cf. Rosenfeld 
1999 a; Rosenfeld 1999 b; Lichtblau 1999; Rosenfeld 2000; Rosenfeld 2002) 
In the case of mixed funding and sharing of competences between different levels of 
government, the politicians have the possibility to act not in the way which their 
voters had wanted. The reason for this possibility is that such deviations may easily 
be explained to the voters with the decisions of the other levels of government. If the 
politicians at each level are acting this way, at last no one is feeling responsible for   16
wrong decisions. The voters are not able to find out who was responsible, because of 
the intransparancy of intergovernmental decision making processes. 
Apart from these problems, mixed funding is also inefficient because it leads to 
higher costs of bureaucracy, because administrational bodies are not only necessary 
at one, but at several levels of government (cf. e.g. Olbrich 1987). 
The problems of a mixed funding of public activities are leading to the proposal that 
the mixed funding  and the sharing of competences between different levels of 
government should better be stopped. A disentanglement of responsibilities would 
lead to more efficiency in regional policy. One way in this direction could be to give 
the competence for deciding on the development-targets for implementing a specific 
set of instruments in specific regions to the regions themselves. 
(b) Losses in Efficiency because of Special Purpose Grants in Aid to the Localities 
The potential recipients of grants have a tendency for applying for grant programs, 
even if there is no need for a special purpose grant. With the help of the grants, the 
policy makers at the decentral level of government are able to expand their budgets. 
” Cheap money from higher levels of government„  is always a good argument for 
such expansion strategies ’ which will lead to losses in economic development. This 
is especially true in the case of matching grants in aid: The supported regions are not 
only applying for funds they do not need, they also have to spend their own money 
for less relevant activities. 
Another aspect is that the policy makers at the decentral level may try to deceive the 
giver of the grants. If they try to adjust the description of projects (which may be 
important for the economic development of the supported regions) so that the 
descriptions are ” well fitting„  the criteria which are the conditions for getting the 
grants, it is not possible for the higher levels of government to direct the decisions 
of politicians in the supported regions. In this case, special purpose grants are 
making no sense at all. 
Finally, if there are no grants in aid for an activity which may be of g reatest 
importance for regional development, the decision makers in the supported regions 
will tend to wait till perhaps someday there will be a suitable grants in aid program. 
In the result, relevant infrastructure is still missing in the supported regions. 
A solution could be to change the current grant programs into general grants in aid ’ 
only with the condition that the supported regions have to use the money they get   17
for improving their economic performance. Of course, the regions have to prove the 
effectiveness of their decisions. 
6.  Conclusions 
From the theoretical point of view, there are only a few arguments to legitimate the 
central (European) competences in the field of regional policy. Subsidy-control should 
remain a task of the EU level. As ’ at least in the case of Germany ’ the European 
system of regional policy has some advantages, as compared to the national system, a 
decentralization may not be favourable (as long as the German system is not ready to 
change). With regard to the responsibility  to financing regional policy, a 
decentralization would be better than the present state. But decentralizing in the field of 
financing could not mean that the more central units of government should no longer be 
responsible for shifting resources to the poorer regions. The change should take place in 
the sense that the supported regions are getting more leeway in deciding how to make 
use of these resources. This will enable the decision makers in the supported regions to 
take the best measures for the development of their regions; but such a system will only 
work under some conditions: 
-  the decision makers of the supported regions must have strong incentives to spend 
money for programs which will lead, in the long run, to make their regions 
independent from support, 
-  the decision makers have to know which instruments and programs are most 
appropriate for this goal; at the moment, regional economic theory is not able for 
giving enough clues (specified for individual regional conditions) in order to 
facilitate this task; this means, that regional economic theory has to be improved as 
a precondition for decentralization in the field of regional policy, 
-  the decision makers have to account for their decisions, and the central level must 
have the right to cut further t ransfers to a region if the decision makers of a 
supported region are not able to explain why their region has made no progress (in 
direction to become independent from support from outside).   18
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Footnotes 
                                                 
1  The system of general revenue sharing (the fiscal equalization system) has the task of only 
alimentating the poorer regions. 
2  ‘ GRW”  means  ‘ Gemeinschaftsaufgabe  ,Verbesserung der Regionalen Wirtschaftsstrukturö” , the 
German term for ‘ Federal-state program ,Improving the Regional Structure of the Economyö” . 
3  ‘ Federal”  means in this case that a joint commission of federal and state governments is responsible 
for the planning process, and both the German parliament and the German upper house (‘parliament 
of the states” ) have to aprove the plans. 
4  Respectively: the localities or the local level of government in the supported regions. 
5  Interreg is (at present) one out of four ” community initiatives„ . The other three are ” Urban„ , ” Leader„  
and ” Equal„ . From the view of regional policy, Interreg is the most important of theses ” initiatives„ , 
therefore, only Interreg will be discussed. 
6  Not including West-Berlin. 
7  The federal-state planning commission for regional policy is responsible for this task. 